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ALTHOUGH it would be dificult to detect from the reported opinions,
workmen's compensation law and practice in Texas has undergone major
change within the past five to seven years.' The Industrial Accident Board
has been given more power and the benefits have been substanially increased. 2
Medical care for the injured workman is now receiving a significant amount
of time and attention from the board, the practitioners, and the insurance
carriers. Fewer cases are being appealed from the board to the trial court
level, although those cases in which there are legitimate differences continue
to be appealed and tried.8 These changes have not come about without
a major shift in emphasis (and some compromise) on the part of all the
participants, the lawyers, the administrative agency, and the insurance car-
riers.
The past survey period has seen sweeping changes, occurring primarily
in the legislative field. This Article will review the legislative changes first
and then deal with developments occurring at the appellate level, both sub-
stantive and procedural.
I. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
During 1973 the 63rd Legislature made the most extensive changes in
the Texas workmen's compensation law since its inception in 1913, with at
least six major revisions being made in the substantive law.4 These changes,
of course, were not all new ideas or proposals as numerous bills have been
introduced in past legislative sessions seeking the changes that ultimately
were made in 1973. The impetus which led to the major revision of the
Texas workmen's compensation law came primarily from the final report of
the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. 5 The
* B.A., Baylor University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Irving,
Texas.
1. The Act itself has been substantially amended each session of the legislature
since 1967, e.g., The Workmen's Compensation-Administrative Reform Bill of 1969, ch.
18, [1969] Tex. Laws 48.
2. As late as May 17, 1969, the maximum weekly benefits were only $35 per
week. On Sept. 1, 1973, this was increased from $49 to $63 per week, and will become
$70 per week on Sept. 1, 1974.
3. Statistics from 1969-1972 TEXAs CIVIL JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORTS in-
dicate the following activity in workmen's compensation cases for all district courts
in Texas:
1969 1970 1971 1972
New Cases Filed 8,664 3,920 3,887 3,758
Agreed Judgments 7,874 4,570 2,814 2,511
Jury Verdicts 337 303 249 261
Total Dispositions 10,139 6,180 4,157 3,933
4. The major areas amended concerned (1) increased coverage; (2) increased
benefits; (3) death benefits; (4) medical benefits and procedures; (5) loss prevention
and services; and (6) third party claims and procedures.
5. The National Commission was established by the Occupational Safety and
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Commission attempted to evaluate existing workmen's compensation statutes
and was further charged with making recommendations for changes in those
statutes. Obviously, not all of the National Commission's recommendations
were enacted into law in Texas. However, a large number were adopted, 6
and the force of this report, as well as the ultimate threat of a federal com-
pensation system, 7 had a sobering effect on all of the participants on the
workmen's compensation scene.
Increased Coverage. Since 1917 the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act
has excluded the employees of any firm, person, or corporation in which
there were less than three employees.' This numerical exemption has now
been eliminated,9 although the Act still does not apply to employees who
are injured while working as domestic servants, casual employees engaged
in employment incidental to a personal residence, farm laborers, ranch la-
borers, nor to the employees of any common carrier by rail.10 Coverage
has also been extended for the first time to all state employees." An em-
ployee is defined as a "person in the service of the state under [a] ...
contract of hire whose compensation is paid by warrant issued by the comp-
troller except a person employed by the State Highway Department or by
an institution of higher education subject to a separate workman's compen-
sation law.' 1 2
Effective July 1, 1974, workmen's compensation insurance will also be
provided for employees of political subdivisions of the state, which are de-
fined as "a county, home-rule city, city, town, or village organized under
the general laws of this state, a special district, a school district, a junior
college district, or any other legally constituted political subdivision of the
state.' 3 The only persons excluded are those employees who are "paid on
a piecework basis or on a basis other than by the hour, day, week, month,
or year.' 14
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 676 (1970). The comprehensive revision of the
Texas statutes was "an effort to bring the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law in line
with the standards prescribed by the National Commission on State Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws." TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE 63D LEGIS-
LATURE-REGULAR SESSION, JANUARY 9-MAY 28, 1973: A SUMMARY.
6. See, e.g., ch. 88, § 1, [1973] Tex. Laws 187, making coverage compulsory for
all employers. "We recommend that coverage by workmen's compensation laws be
compulsory and that no waiver be permitted." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 45 (1972).
7. The National Commission rejected the suggestion that federal administration
be substituted for state programs at this time. However, several of the individual com-
missioners felt such a federal system would be appropriate if present deficiencies in
state laws were not promptly corrected. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
6, at 26-27.
8. Ch. 103, pt. I, § 2, [1917] Tex. Laws 270, as amended, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 8306, § 2 (Supp. 1973).
9. Id.
10. The National Commission noted that the occupations typically excluded from
coverage by the states, farm and household workers, are disproportionately low-income,
less educated, non-white, and female, and least able financially to carry the burden of
disability by themselves. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 44.
11. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309g (Supp. 1973).
12. Id. Some problems may arise because of this requirement since all state em-
ployees are not necessarily paid by the comptroller.
13. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309h (Supp. 1973).
14. Id. art. 8309h, § 2. The Act authorizes political subdivisions to provide work-
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Another extension of workmen's compensation which became effective
September 1, 1973, now permits a subscriber to cover a partner, sole pro-
prietor, or other corporate executive officer. 15 Formerly, only corporate ex-
ecutive officers could be included in a subscriber's workmen's compensation
coverage. It is very likely that this coverage will become quite popular due
to the increased benefits provided by the basic coverage under the Act.
Increased Benefits. Beginning September 1, 1973, the maximum weekly
benefit was increased to $63 and the minimum benefit was raised to $15
per week. The maximum and minimum weekly benefits will again be in-
creased after August 31, 1974, to $70 and $16 respectively. After that date
the maximum and minimum benefits will be determined by the statistics
published by the Texas Employment Commission in its report "The Average
Weekly Wage." For every $10 increase in the average weekly wage for
manufacturing production workers in Texas, the maximum weekly benefit
will be increased by $7 and the minimum 'by $1.10 The benefits for spe-
cific injuries were also increased, limited by amounts of the maximum and
minimum weekly benefits, although the number of weeks for particular in-
juries remained the same.' 7  The percentage of the average weekly wage
paid as compensation was also increased from 60 percent to 66% percent.
Thus, for total incapacity resulting from an on-the-job injury the injured em-
ployee can receive weekly compensation equal to 66% percent of his avera-
age weekly wages, but not more than the maximum weekly benefit.' 8 This
same limitation also applies to partial incapacity, except that for partial in-
capacity the employee can receive 662/3 percent of the difference between
his average weekly wages before the injury and the average weekly wage
earning capacity during the existence of the partial incapacity, once again
not to exceed the maximum weekly benefit. 19
Death Benefits. Prior to September 1, 1973, Texas law allowed the legal
beneficiaries of a deceased workman to recover a maximum of $49 per week
for a total of 360 weeks,20 or $15,442.10 discounted to present value for
a lump sum payment. These benefits were substantially increased by the
63rd Legislature by allowing the widow or widower of a deceased employee
to receive benefits equal to 66% percent of the deceased employee's average
weekly wage, limited by the minimum and maximum benefit of the bene-
ficiary.21 In the event of remarriage, the beneficiary will be entitled to re-
ceive a lump sum payment equal in benefits due for a period of two years. 22
men's compensation coverage by self-insuring individually or by entering into agree-
ments with other political subdivisions, or by standard workmen's compensation poli-
cies.
15. Id. art. 8309, § la (Supp. 1973), amending id. (1967).
16. Id. art. 8306, § 29c (Supp. 1973). The automatic increase in benefits provided
in the Act will eliminate much of the legislative in-fighting with respect to increased
benefits which has gone on since enactment of the Act in 1913.
17. Id. art. 8306, § 12 (Supp. 1973), amending id. (1967).
18. Id. art. 8306, § 10 (Supp. 1973), amending id. (1967).
19. Id. art. 8306, § 11 (Supp. 1973), amending id. (1967).
20. Ch. 18, § 2, [1969] Tex. Laws 48, as amended, Tx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306, § 8 (Supp. 1973).




Weekly payments will also be payable to children under age eighteen or be-
yond if the child is actually dependent and to children up to age twenty-
five if enrolled as full-time students. 23  However, legal beneficiaries other
than the widow or widower and children are still limited to a maximum ben-
efit period of 360 weeks.
The new death benefit provisions prohibit lump sum payments to a
widow, widower, or children except in the case of remarriage or "in case
of bona fide disputes as to the liability of the association for the death."
Further, the settlement of a death case must be approved by the Industrial
Accident Board or by a court, and such approval must be based upon "an
express finding that a bona fide dispute exists" as to the carrier's liability.24
The Act also provides that in death cases which are settled with the carrier
admitting liability for the death, but where there is a dispute as to who are
the proper beneficiaries, both the settlement and reasonable attorney's fees
(not exceeding twenty-five percent) shall be paid in weekly installments
rather than in a lump sum.25
This new provision increasing death benefits will obviously provide the
basis for additional litigation as several questions are raised by the revised
statute. The following questions exemplify the ambiguities resulting from the
revision. Will the remarriage of the beneficiary also include common-law
marriage? In terms of benefits to surviving children who attend schools of
higher education, what constitutes a full-time student? Further, in the event
a death case is settled in court, what will be the amount of money that the
widow or widower will be entitled to receive in settlement of the death ben-
efits actions arising under the Compensation Act? Will the beneficiary be
entitled in any circumstances to recover the value, in a lump sum, of the
weekly payments for the balance of his or her life expectancy? These ques-
tions must await the answers of Texas appellate courts.
Medical Benefits and Procedures. Prior to September 1, 1973, the insur-
ance carrier retained the right to select the physician to administer the med-
ical services allowed by the Workmen's Compensation Act and the employee
could not recover for expenses incurred for treatment by another doctor.26
The only exceptions to this general rule were that the employee could pro-
cure the services of any available doctor for immediate first-aid treatment
or for later treatment if the association failed to provide it within a reason-
able time after receiving notice of the injury.27 This obviously resulted in
a great deal of litigation as to whether or not the insurance carrier had
failed, refused, or neglected to provide medical services, and as to what kind
of notice was necessary in order to allow reliance upon this particular sec-




26. Ch. 397, § 1, [1957] Tex. Laws 1187, as amended, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
(Tex. 1971), holding that when insurer is furnishing treatment, it is not liable for med-
ical services performed by another doctor chosen by the injured party.
27. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Supp. 1973).
28. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. v. Chappell, 494 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1973); Few
v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1971).
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The amendment to article 8306, section 7 now permits the employee to
have the "sole right" to choose the person or facilities from which he desires
to receive medical treatment. The insurer is obligated to pay for the med-
ical treatment by the doctor chosen, or at the employee's option, to furnish
him with treatment and facilities of its choosing. 29
Another significant change concerns the relationship of the treating phy-
sician or chiropractor to the injured workman, the Industrial Accident Board,
and the insurance carrier. The new law provides that it is the duty of a
physician or chiropractor rendering medical care to an injured workman "to
render an initial report as soon as practical" following the injury, to the In-
dustrial Accident Board, the association, and the injured workman, stating
the nature and extent of the injury.30 Thereafter, the treating physician is
required to submit such subsequent reports as are reasonably necessary to
keep the parties advised of the condition of the injured person. Failure to
submit the reports operates to relieve both the injured workman and the in-
surance carrier from any obligation to pay for the services rendered.31 This
is a significant change from the law existing prior to September 1, 1973,
and could well be the change having the most practical impact on the phy-
sician, the injured workman, the insurance carrier, and the board. This
particular topic has been debated for quite some time and has generally
been resisted by the insurance carriers because of the fear that "plaintiffs'
doctors" would take over the practice in the workmen's compensation area
and thus run up exorbitant medical bills.
Third Party Actions. Prior to September 1, 1973,2 an injured employee
who had been harmed due to the actions of a "third party" could not pursue,
at the same time, both his claim for compensation benefits and his suit for
damages iagainst the third party.33 If he "elected" to proceed against the
third party then he waived his compensation benefits.34 Now a claimant
can pursue a cause of action against a third person and "he shall not be
held to have waived his rights to compensation under this law."'35 Not only
does this amendment allow a compensation claim and third party suit to be
instituted simultaneously, but it also changes the statute of limitations with
respect to filing a claim against the third person. Before this amendment,
it was well established that the two-year statute of limitations with respect
to the third party action was tolled if the claimant elected to proceed under
29. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Supp. 1973), amending id. (1967).
Section 7a, dealing with changes in medical treatment if there existed reasonable
grounds for believing the health of the employee was being endangered by the treat-
ment he was receiving, was also amended, conforming it with amended § 7. If the
board orders a change in doctors, the association is relieved of liability unless the em-
ployee promptly complies. Id. art. 8306, § 7a (Supp. 1974), amending id. (1967).
30. Id. art. 8306, § 7 (Supp. 1973), amending id. (1967).
31. Id.
32. Ch. 103, pt. IV, § 3b, [1917] Tex. Laws 293, as amended, TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 3b (Supp. 1973).
33. Id. art. 8307, § 6a (1967). This section of the Act had not been changed
since 1917.
34. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Brandon, 126 Tex. 636, 89 S.W.2d 982 (1936);
Fort Worth Lloyds v. Essley, 235 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1951), error
ref.
35. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Supp. 1973).
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the Workmen's Compensation Act and was successful. The action against
the third party was held not to accrue until the award of the board was
paid or the claimant obtained 'a final judgment. 36  The supreme court in
Campbell v. Sonford Chemical Co.37 specifically noted that this extension
of the usual two-year statute of limitations was due to the election features
of article 8307, section 6a and urged the legislature to amend it so as to
permit the workman to file a third party action without forfeiting his right
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court also noted that if this
were done, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury
actions should be controlling rather than article 8307, section 4a which re-
moves compensation cases from the ambit of the two-year statute.3 8
The new statute still allows the compensation carrier its right to subroga-
tion, but does modify the procedure concerning the method of repayment
of the carrier.89 For example, in a third party wrongful death case in which
the plaintiff-beneficiary has received workmen's compensation death bene-
fits (on a weekly basis due to the new amendments to the death benefits
section of the Act) the carrier is entitled to be reimbursed. Then, if there
is any excess remaining, the weekly death benefit payments may be sus-
pended by the carrier until the suspended benefits equal the amount of the
excess, at which time weekly compensation benefits again become payable. 40
The new amendments retained the carrier's right to enforce a third party
claim on its own initiative in the name of the injured employee or of his
legal beneficiaries. However, the carrier's unfettered right to subrogation
has now been "taxed" under certain conditions with a reasonable attorney's
fee. Under the statute prior to September 1, 1973, in a third party case41
the insurance company could do nothing about prosecuting the claim against
the third person, and if there was a recovery it was entitled to reimburse-
ment of the monies which it had paid out pursuant to the Act. If the car-
rier chose to intervene in the employee's third party action, the Act allowed
the carrier to recover a reasonable attorney's fee out of the monies recovered
by the employee.42 The new article 8307, section 6a now provides that if
the insurance company's interest is not actively represented by an attorney
the company shall pay a fee to the claimant's attorney not to exceed one-
,third of the subrogation recovery. In the absence of any agreement between
the claimant's attorney and the carrier, the trial court is authorized to allow
a reasonable attorney's fee not to exceed one-third of the recovery payable
out of the carrier's part of the recovery.43
36. Campbell v. Sonford Chem. Co., 486 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1972). The court also
held that should a claimant be unsuccessful in attempting to invoke the workmen's com-
pensation law or should his case remain in litigation for more than two years before
a final judgment, the two-year statute of limitations would be applicable, and in the
latter case bar the third party action. Id. at 934.
37. 486 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1972).
38. Id.
39. Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Supp. 1973).
40. Id.
41. Ch. 103, pt. II, § 6a, [1917] Tex. Laws 285, as amended, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.





In the event the claimant's attorney is also representing the carrier, full
disclosure in writing must be made to the claimant, acknowledged by him,
with copies of the disclosure being furnished to all parties and also made
a part of the board's file. If this disclosure is not made then the claimant's
attorney is not entitled to any fee from the carrier.44 If the insurance com-
pany retains its own counsel to represent its interest in the third party claim
then the court is authorized to award an attorney's fee of up to one-third
of the carrier's subrogation recovery.
The new amendments also clearly indicate that proceeding to judgment
against a third party does not preclude the injured workman from recovering
additional compensation benefits. After the conclusion of the third party
case, if the claimant is entitled to additional compensation benefits, he may
now receive them. However, if the claimant has obtained from the third
party any monies over and above those already paid to the carrier for its
subrogation interest, then that excess "shall be treated as an advance against
future benefit payments of compensation to which the beneficiary is entitled
to receive under the Act."'45 If the excess is exhausted then the carrier must
resume payments.
Loss Prevention Services. Another significant change in the insurance laws
bearing on workmen's compensation coverage is found in a recent amend-
ment to the Texas Insurance Code requiring carriers to provide accident pre-
vention facilities as a prerequisite for a license to write such insurance in
Texas.46 The new law further describes the type of services to be provided
and the educational requirements for "field safety representatives." It also
provides that the insurer shall render these accident prevention services to
its policyholders. The State Board of Insurance is further authorized to hold
hearings to determine whether or not the insurer is providing and maintain-
ing the accident prevention services. If the board determines -that the car-
rier is not in compliance, its license to write workmen's compensation insur-
ance may be revoked. The State Board of Insurance is authorized to pro-
mulgate reasonable rules and regulations for the enforcement of the new
law. It could be that this new requirement will discourage marginal insur-
ance companies from seeking to write compensation insurance in Texas.
II. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Coverage. The question of whether or not a workman's injury falls within
the coverage provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act47 continues to
be at issue in appellate opinions. In a case of first impression, Commercial
Standard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Galindo, the El Paso court of civil ap-
peals held that an alien whose presence in this country was illegal still could
be an employee within the meaning of the Texas Workmen's Compensation
Act and qualify for benefits thereunder.48 The court relied on both a fed-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.76-1 (Supp. 1974).
47. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967).
48. Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Galindo, 484 S.W.2d 635
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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eral civil rights statute giving all persons within the United States the same
right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, and to the full and equal benefit
of laws as enjoyed by other citizens, 49 as well as authorities of other juris-
dictions, in reaching this conclusion. The case was distinguished from the
situations in which the work contracted for is illegal. Here the work per-
formed had no connection with, nor did it aid, the illegal entry of the plain-
tiff.50
Coverage claimed by a plaintiff who based his claim on the existence of
a compensation insurance policy was denied in Hudgens v. Texas Casualty
Insurance Co.' The claimant's employer was a subcontractor on a general
construction job on which the general contractor carried workmen's compen-
sation insurance. Prior to claimant's injury his employer approached an
agent of the defendant carrier inquiring about workmen's compensation cov-
erage for his crew, but made no application and paid no premium at that
time. Without authority from the employer, the agent applied for and re-
ceived a policy prior to the date of injury, but the policy was cancelled due
to the subcontractor's failure to send in the forms and necessary premium.
Following claimant's injury the agent representing the general contractor's
carrier obtained the subcontractor's signature to the necessary application
forms, and obtained a check for the premium for coverage with the defend-
ant. This was all done without informing the defendant that a claim was
pending. Following the rule announced in Burch v. Commonwealth County
Mutual Insurance Co.,5 2 the court held that the failure to disclose the facts
of the plaintiff's pending claim constituted fraud, thus enabling the carrier
who had covered the subcontractor to set aside the policy which it had is-
sued.
Good Cause. In order to perfect a claim for compensation benefits, the in-
jured workman must give notice of injury to his employer within thirty days
after the happening of the injury or the discovery of the occupational di-
sease.5" Additionally, the injured employee must file a claim for compen-
sation benefits with the board within six months after the injury or the dis-
covery of the occupational disease.5 4 The statute provides that "for good
cause" strict compliance with these limitations may be waived. Most of the
cases during the survey period were concerned with whether or not there
was any evidence to support an allegation of good cause. In the only case
during the survey period in which a claimant was successful in establishing
good cause, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bruns,55 the appellate court af-
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970):
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
50. 484 S.W.2d at 636.
51. 491 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), error dismissed.
52. 450 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1970).
53. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
54. Id.
55. 490 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error rej. n.r.e.
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firmed a jury finding that claimant delayed filing his claim because he had
relied on a building manager's representation that all necessary papers in
connection with the claim would be filed. The Austin court recited the rule
enunciated in Hawkins v. Safety Casualty Co.56 that the test "is that of ordi-
nary prudence, that is, whether the claimant prosecuted his claim with the
degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised
under the same or similar circumstances. '57 The court further relied upon
the Hawkins rule that a jury finding of good cause can be overturned "only
when the evidence, construed most favorably for the claimant, admits no
other reasonable conclusion." 58
The claimant was unsuccessful in establishing his claim for good cause
in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Dickson,59 where the injured work-
man sought to rely on a representation by the insurance adjuster that he
would have a year within which to file his claim. The claimant was injured
on March 17, 1968, and his claim was not filed until March 7, 1969. The
appellant had moved to Colorado following the injury and consulted a Col-
orado attorney about his claim in October 1968. The jury found he had
relied upon the representation of the carrier's adjuster continuously until his
claim was filed and that such reliance constituted good cause for the delay
in filing. The appellate court distinguished this representation by the ad-
juster from the more common one of "it will be taken care of," because
in this case it was one of law, and not one with respect to a fact "exclusively
within the knowledge of the one making the representation." 60  The repre-
sentation as to filing a claim within one year was held to constitute good
cause, until the claimant employed his lawyer. The representation of law
by the adjuster, who possessed superior knowledge of the law, was held to
be within the exception to the general rule that "an action will not lie for
misrepresentation of a matter of law,"'6 ' and thus constituted good cause.
However, the superior knowledge of the adjuster was no longer an unfair
advantage after the claimant consulted an attorney, and did not constitute
good cause for failure to file after that time. The attorney was the agent
of the claimant, and his delay in filing the claim was imputed to the claim-
ant.
A contention that a claim was not filed because of reliance upon a rep-
resentation by a foreman or supervisor that "everything would be taken care
of" is ordinarily sufficient to establish good cause. The claimant, however,
failed to establish such contention in Bray v. Texas Employers' Insurance
Ass'n.62 The evidence showed that the injured workman had been assured
by a superintendent not to worry about anything and that the company
would take care of him. However, he was later informed by his employer's
56. 146 Tex. 381, 207 S.W.2d 370 (1948). See also Texas Cas. Ins. Co. v. Beas-
ley, 391 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1965).
57. 146 Tex. at 384, 207 S.W.2d at 372.
58. Id.
59. 489 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
60. Id. at 657.
61. Id.
62. 483 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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secretary that nothing had been filed with the Industrial Accident Board on
his behalf, and it was not until some five to six months later that the claim
was actually filed with the board. During this time the claimant was not re-
ceiving any compensation payments. The court held that the insurance
company's summary judgment should be sustained since a person of ordinary
prudence would not have remained unconcerned about his rights for such
a long period of time relying upon his employer's representation that the
claim would be taken care of. This was especially true since the claimant
had been hospitalized on several occasions for his injury and had obtained
medical care on numerous occasions. In so holding, the court relied on the
earlier case of Allstate Insurance Co. v. King63 in which the supreme court
reached a similar conclusion where there was a sixteen-month delay in filing
based upon an employer's promise.
An employee's contention that he felt that his injury was minor or trivial
and that it would get better is generally good cause for failure to timely
file for workmen's compensation benefits provided it continues to exist until
the time of filing.64 A different twist to this contention, however, was pre-
sented in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Renfro.65 Here, there was
no question that claimant sustained a serious injury. He contended, how-
ever, that his physician and doctors had represented to him that everything
"would be all right." His condition did not improve, but he failed to file
his claim until seventeen months after the injury. The court held that claim-
ant's reliance upon his physicians that his condition was only "temporary"
should not be found to constitute good cause because temporary injuries are
compensable. Also, the fact that the injury was obviously serious was held
to prevent the claimant from bringing himself within the ambit of
good cause.
Shortly after Renfro was decided a similar fact situation came before the
Texas Supreme Court in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hughes.66 The
Corpus Christi court of civil appeals upheld a trial court finding that good
cause existed for failure to timely file a compensation claim based upon the
claimant's not realizing the seriousness of his condition. The claimant had
been hospitalized for some three months and had had numerous operations.
He developed a bone infection in his right leg below the knee several years
later. He did not file his claim until some fifteen months following the in-
jury. The supreme court found the Corpus Christi decision was in conflict
with Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Portley67 on the issue of good
cause. The supreme court found Portley to be controlling and quoting from
that case held: "[T]he plaintiff had a manifestly serious and disabling con-
dition of which he was fully aware. At the very least it was a condition
which we hold should and would have led any reasonably prudent person
63. 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1969).
64. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brantley, 402 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1966).
65. 496 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), error dismissed.
66. 497 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1973).
67. 153 Tex. 62, 263 S.W.2d 247 (1953).
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under the same or similar circumstances to protect his rights by filing his
claim." 68
Prior Injury. In Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Monroe 9 the jury
found that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled. The insurance
carrier appealed, contending that a prior injury had contributed to the pres-
ent incapacity. The appellate court rejected this argument, stating that
while the evidence did show that the prior injury contributed to the exist-
ing incapacity, there was no evidence of the amount or percentage of such
contribution and for that reason the insurance carrier's requested issues on
that topic were properly refused.
Causal Connection. In recent years the Texas Supreme Court has written
extensively on -the thorny problem of "causation," the evidentiary connection
required to establish the connection between the injury and the resulting dis-
ability.70 Although the evidentiary guidelines are now more clearly spelled
out, cases continue to arise concerning whether the evidence is sufficient to
establish the causal connection between the precipitating event and the in-
capacity. The large majority of these cases deal with heart attack injuries.
One case simply reaffirmed the long-standing rule that a strain, such as
caused by racking eight-inch pipe, sustained by an employee in the course
of his employment is generally regarded as an "accidental" injury.71
The Amarillo court of civil appeals affirmed a directed verdict in favor
of the compensation carrier in a heart attack death case wherein the claim-
ant's evidence was that the deceased had been climbing a ladder and doing
other moderately strenuous tasks prior to the attack.72 The court of appeals
found there was no evidence of strain or overexertion on the day of the
fatal attack, and therefore no "accidental injury." The supreme court re-
versed, holding that the evidence did raise fact issues as to whether or not
the deceased suffered strain or over-exertion in the course of his work activ-
ities. The court noted that in virtually all such cases as this the evidence
will be circumstantial in nature, and it is, thus, impossible to formulate a
precise rule to measure its probative force and determine if issues of fact
are raised. Here there was evidence that there was a heart attack during
the course of work which resulted in almost immediate death; that the claim-
ant had heart disease which normally limited his work to supervision of
others; but that on the day of his death he had done some physical work;
and medical testimony that the work could have been the cause of the attack
68. 497 S.W.2d at 283, quoting 153 Tex. at 67, 263 S.W.2d at 250.
69. 495 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
70. See Griffin v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 450 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1969); In-
surance Co. of N. America v. Kneten, 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969); Parker v. Employ-
ers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969); Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436
S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Meyers, 411 S.W.2d 710
(Tex. 1966); Musslewhite, Medical Causation Testimony in Texas: Possibility Versus
Probability, 23 Sw. L.J. 622 (1969).
71. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 488 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tex-
arkana 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
72. Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 483 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ama-
rillo 1972), error granted.
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was held to raise issues of fact. This case was distinguished from those in
which there is no evidence circumstantial or otherwise, that there was strain
or exertion which could have caused the heart attack. 73
Setting Aside Compromise Settlement Agreements. Following the general
rule that fraud vitiates every transaction tainted by it,74 claimants are per-
mitted to set aside compromise settlement agreements75 if they are able to
prove that they were entered into on the basis of some fraud or misrepre-
sentation associated with the agreement. In a suit to set aside a compromise
settlement agreement there are three basic elements that must be shown by
the plaintiff: (1) that the false representations were made by the insurance
carrier or its agents; (2) that plaintiff relied on these representations; (3)
that his injury was greater than the amount of money paid under the com-
promise settlement agreement which he seeks to set aside. 76
The Dallas court of civil appeals reaffirmed the rule in Texas that a cul-
pable state of mind is unnecessary to constitute fraud. In Mackintosh v.
Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n 7 claimant sought to set aside a compro-
mise settlement due to the insurance adjuster's representation that $376 was
the maximum amount which he could recover under the law for his injury.
The jury found that at the time of the settlement the adjuster did not know
that claimant's disability was greater than the permanent partial disability
existing at that time. Thus, the carrier argued that since its adjuster did
not intentionally misrepresent the facts the agreement could not be set aside.
The appellate court, however, rejected this argument, holding that it was
not essential to plaintiff's cause of action that he establish intentional mis-
representation on the part of the insurance adjuster, as an innocent misrep-
resentation is "evidence of a mutual mistake or of what is sometimes called
'constructive fraud.' "78 The compensation carrier also asserted that the set-
tlement should not be set aside because the adjuster based his representa-
tion upon a medical opinion concerning disability from a doctor chosen by
the claimant. The court rejected this based on earlier case law holding that
if the insurance carrier uses the medical opinion of a doctor, then it stands
charged with the correctness of such statement.
Maturity Suits. The statute provides that if the board makes a final order,
ruling, or decision and the insurance carrier refuses to comply with that or-
der, ruling, or decision, then the claimant may bring a suit to recover his
damages in addition to a twelve percent penalty together with reasonable
attorney's fees. 79  This kind of suit is commonly referred to as a "maturity
73. Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973).
74. Drinkard v. Ingram, 21 Tex. 650 (1858).
75. The board can approve compromise settlement agreements only where the car-
rier's liability or the extent of the injury to the employee is uncertain, indefinite, or
incapable of being satisfactorily established. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, §
12 (1967).
76. Brannon v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 293, 224 S.W.2d 466,
468 (1949).
77. 486 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
78. Id. at 152.
79. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5a (1967).
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suit." In Insurance Co. of North America v. Escalante8 ° the San Antonio
court allowed such a maturity suit in which the board awarded the claimant
some $400. It was noted that in Pacific Employers' Insurance Co. v. Bran-
non8' the Texas Supreme Court had held that a carrier incurs the statutory
penalties where it fails to abide by the board's approval of a compromise
settlement agreement. Thus, the appellate court concluded that it was
proper to permit the employee to assert a cause of action under the pro-
visions of article 8307, section 5a, of the Revised Statutes. The case was
remanded to the trial court for a finding of the amount of reasonable at-
torney's fees because there had been no summary judgment proof as to a
reasonable amount.
Reaching a different result with respect to attorney's fees, the court in
Barnes v. Bituminous Casualty Corp.82 found that a suit to enforce an agree-
ment by the carrier to pay all accrued medical expenses did not entitle the
claimant to recover attorney's fees. The Amarillo court of civil appeals ap-
parently construed this as a suit on a contract as the plaintiff had denomi-
nated it in the pleadings and appellate brief, and as such concluded article
2226 did not authorize the award of attorney's fees. However, the court
also determined that article 8307, section 5a, which provides for attorney's
fees in a maturity suit, was also inapplicable because that section is re-
stricted to awards of the boards or judgments of a court, and that the settle-
ment agreement here was neither. The court relied upon Pearce v. Texas
Employers' Insurance Ass'n83 in reaching this conclusion. This result would
appear to be in conflict with Escalante and Brannon to at least some extent
because Escalante construed Brannon as holding that attorney's fees are re-
coverable for delay in payment of the amount of ,the settlement. In Barnes
the Amarillo court found the holding of Pearce to be that section 5 had
''no application to a compromise settlement agreement approved by the
Board. '84 Perhaps Barnes and Escalante can be reconciled, however,
based upon the type of agreement entered into, in Escalante to pay a certain
amount and in Barnes an agreement to pay accrued medical expenses of
an undetermined amount.
Suits Against Non-Subscribers, Employers. Injured employees may sue their
employer for damages when the employer chooses not to be covered by the
Workmen's Compensation Act. In such a suit all the employee need estab-
lish is that the employer was negligent, since the employer is deprived of
his common law defenses.a5 The El Paso court of civil appeals has held
that a nonsubscriber is not entitled to any immunities of the Act. In Miller
v. D & H Rig Service 6 the employee filed a damage suit against his em-
ployer and later sued a third party for the same injuries. After the suit
against the third party was settled, the employer moved for summary judg-
80. 484 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
81. 150 Tex. 441, 448, 242 S.W.2d 185, 189 (1951).
82. 495 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
83. 412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1967).
84. Id. at 649.
85. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 1 (1967).
86. 497 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1973), error ref.
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ment, arguing that the employee had elected to proceed against the third
party and had thereby waived his right to sue his employer. The appellate
court found that the "election" benefit is applicable only to a subscriber.
It was noted that article 8307, section 6a, by its terms, benefits only the
carrier. "No rights are granted to the eligible nonsubscribing employer."87
The Texas Supreme Court recently held that an employer's promise to
an injured employee to provide him with a job for life was unenforceable
even when, in return, the employee did not file a claim for compensation
benefits. 88 The majority opinion held that such an agreement was precluded
by that part of the Act which provides: "No agreement by an employee
to waive his rights to compensation under this law shall be valid." 89 Noting
that such a construction would work a hardship on employees making such
agreements, it still believed that such an approach would be calculated to
prevent injured workmen from making "unfortunate settlements of their
claims." 90 There was a strong dissent emphasizing that through this device
an employer could preclude a claim for compensation benefits and still not
be required to honor its agreements.
Third Party and Subrogation. Although there was not a large volume of
cases dealing with third-party and subrogation issues, several opinions during
the survey period dealt with new developments in familiar problems. In
Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Meyers9 surviving adult sons were de-
nied death benefits because the Industrial Accident Board found that the
sons were not eligible for recovery as survivors of the deceased under the
compensation law, and the association was ordered to pay benefits into the
Second-Injury Fund.9 2 No compensation payments were made to or on be-
half of the surviving sons. They subsequently filed a damage suit against
the third party allegedly responsible for their father's death and the associa-
tion sought to intervene to recover the monies it had paid to the Second-
Injury Fund together with a reasonable attorney's fee.93 The trial court pro-
hibited the association's intervention because there was no actual payment
by the association to the survivors. The statute allows subrogation only to
the extent of compensation paid by the carrier. The fact that the sons had
filed a claim was of no consequence since the test for recovery of subroga-
tion rights is actual payment by the carrier.
Despite actual payment of medical expense, the carrier's subrogation
rights were denied in Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Miller.94 The
claimant was injured on the job, but filed no claim for workmen's compensa-
tion benefits. His employer's compensation carrier did pay his medical ex-
penses, and when the employee filed against a third party for his injuries,
87. Id. at 540.
88. James v. Vernon Calhoun Packing Co., 498 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1973).
89. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 14 (1967).
90. 498 S.W.2d at 162.
91. 496 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973).
92. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
93. Id. allows the insurance carrier a statutory right of subrogation in claims against
third parties.
94. 497 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973).
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the carrier sought to intervene, claiming subrogation for medical payments
which it had paid. The trial court denied the carrier's intervention and was
affirmed by the appellate court. It was held that because no claim was
made for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, no statu-
tory right of subrogation arose, and because there is no equitable right of
subrogation, there was no basis for the carrier's intervention.
In Ward v. Wright95 a claimant was allowed to sue a fellow employee
for injuries sustained when the claimant's automobile was struck in the rear
by the fellow employee. Ordinarily such a suit would be barred by a pro-
vision in the Act 6 which prohibits suit by employees of a subscriber against
any agent, servant, or employee of the subscribing employer. However, the
Fort Worth court of civil appeals held that an independent tort suit may
be filed against a fellow employee for injuries resulting on the job unless
the liability sought to be imposed on the co-employee is such that the com-
mon employer could be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior. In this case the court found that the employee-defendant, at the time
and place of the accident, was not acting within the course and scope of
employment such that the common employer would be liable.
Occupational Disease. Prior to September 1, 1971, the Act specified only
thirty-one occupational diseases97 and if a disease was not listed in the stat-
ute no compensation was given. One of the procedural difficulties in these
cases was proving the "accidental" nature of the disease. This problem
arose in Haley v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n, in which the claimant
sought to establish the insurance company's liability for the aggravation of
a tubercular condition.98 Claimant was successful in establishing all of the
elements of his claim, but the jury failed to find that the aggravation of
his condition was the result of an accident. The denial of benefits was
affirmed by the appellate court, relying on Olson v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co.99 The court noted that this case arose prior to the effective
date of the amendment to section 20 of the Act. 00  The opinion seemed
to imply that for injuries arising after that date, September 1, 1971, it is
not necessary to submit the special issue as to whether or not the injury
was the result of an accident.
Damage Suit Against Carrier. An unusual fact situation arose in Paradissis
v. Royal Indemnity Co. 101 The employee filed a damage suit against the
workmen's compensation carrier based on the carrier's breach of contract
and alleged negligence in the performance of the contract. The claimant
had sustained an on-the-job injury resulting in a disc defect and fusion of
95. Ward v. Wright, 490 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973). In an
unusual fact situation, the cause of action arose when two employees of a common em-
ployer had an automobile accident on the company parking lot during their lunch
break.
96. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (1967).
97. Ch. 30, § 1, [1959] Tex. Laws 55 (repealed 1971).
98. Haley v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 487 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tex-
arkana 1972).
99. 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972).
100. Tx. RaV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
101. 496 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), error granted.
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the lower back and had received benefits for total and permanent disability.
Suit was filed against the compensation carrier alleging that the carrier had
been notified that plaintiff should be treated by a psychiatrist and that the
carrier breached its contract by failing to provide these services. The plain-
tiff further contended that the insurance carrier was negligent in concealing
plaintiff's true condition from him and from the Industrial Accident Board.
The insurance carrier argued the court had no jurisdiction since all of plain-
tiff's rights flowed from the policy of workmen's compensation insurance.
This argument was sustained by the trial court, and affirmed by the appel-
late court, which noted that if the insurance carrier refused, failed, or ne-
glected to provide medical services within a reasonable time after the injury,
the employee could seek to enforce the statutory remedy found in the medi-
cal benefits portion of the Act. 102 The court observed that if the claimant
was dissatisfied with the medical services furnished to him, he could file a
claim with the Industrial Accident Board and it could effect a change in
the medical services or physicians. 103 Since the claimant had not given the
board an opportunity to rule on these matters, the trial court had no juris-
diction. 10 4 It will be interesting indeed to see if the supreme court holds
that plaintiff has alleged a cause of action against the insurance carrier.
Death Benefits. Cases continue to arise dealing with the problem of
whether or not certain beneficiaries are entitled to workmen's compensation
benefits as a result of a death of a working relative. For instance, in Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Cassavaugh'05 the question was whether or not
an adult daughter of the deceased employee was dependent upon her father
at the time of his death. The claimant's mother and father had been di-
vorced and the claimant had not seen her father for quite some time until
she moved from California to Houston at his request about six months be-
fore his death. During this period he spent approximately $350 on his
daughter. The jury's verdict in favor of the daughter was affirmed by the
appellate court which held that it is not necessary for an adult daughter to
be totally dependent upon her father to qualify as a workman's compensa-
tion death beneficiary. "It is sufficient if she is partially dependent for sup-
port even though she could have subsisted without his contributions."' 06
Similarly, an economically independent widow of a deceased workman
was entitled to benefits for his death sustained on the job even though he
had left her long before his death and had attempted to establish a common-
law marriage with another woman.' 07 In affirming judgment for the widow,
the court found that the second relationship had never come into being and
was invalid since it was meretricious at its inception.
Course of Employment. Despite the existence of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act since 1913, cases continue to arise as to whether the injured em-
102. TEX. REv. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (1967).
103. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7a (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
104. See Industrial Accident Bd. v. Glenn, 144 Tex. 378, 190 S.W.2d 805 (1945).
105. 486 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
106. Id. at 816.
107. Home Indem. Co. v. Edwards, 488 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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ployee sustained his injury while "on-the-job" or during the course of em-
ployment for his employer. Although there is no definition of "course and
scope" of employment contained in the Act, it does contain certain exclu-
sions limiting the coverage and specifically contains a "travel" exclusion. 108
A continuing problem is the assault of an employee while on the job. In
Highlands Underwriters Insurance Co. v. McGrath'0 the appellate court
reversed jury findings favorable to the surviving widow and minor daughter
of a deceased employee killed by a shotgun blast. It was noted that the
burden of proof was on claimant to show that the assault was connected
to the employment and was directed against him in his capacity as an em-
ployee. The court noted that there was too much evidence sustaining the
fact that the attack was for a personal reason of revenge or anger."10 A
similar situation arose in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Upton,"'1 where
a wife was shot by her former husband while on the job. The surviving
beneficiaries presented expert psychiatric testimony to the effect that the for-
mer husband was not capable of entertaining a rational intention to injure
the ex-wife. The appellate court agreed with the contention that subsec-
tion 2 of section 1 of article 8309 of the Act did not apply in this case.
However, the court did hold that there was no evidence to show that the
death originated in or had any connection with 'the work or business of the
employer, as required by the Act."12 Therefore, the trial court's judgment
for claimants was reversed and rendered since the death did not arise out
of the employment of the deceased.
The beneficiaries of a deceased employee who was killed while traveling
in her own automobile were denied recovery in United States Fidelity
Guaranty Co. v. Harris.113 The deceased employee was working as the
supervisor of a country club bar and grill. As a part of her duties, she was
required to pick up supplies in Longview and take them to Kilgore. She
also lived in Longview and had to travel to Kilgore every day in order to
get to work. The appellate court found that she would have made the trip
anyway and thus the claim fell within that part of the Act which prohibits
recovery for travel injuries unless the trip would not have been made but
for the employment. 1 4
Using the same standard, recovery was allowed by the court of appeals
for a claimant who was on vacation at the time of her injuries but who had
returned to her employer's place of business as required by the employer
to pick up her paycheck."15
108. Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (1967).
109. 485 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-EL Paso 1972).
110. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967) states as follows: "The term
'injury sustained in the course of employment,' as used in this Act, shall not include:
(2) An injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee
because of reasons personal to him and not directed against him as an employee, or
because of his employment."
111. 492 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973).
112. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(4) (1967).
113. 489 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
114. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § l(b) (1967).
115. Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Luce, 491 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1973), error ref. n.r.e. In this case the injured employee worked in a cafeteria and
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with a case" 6 in which
the deceased employee's survivors sought to change Texas law 17 with re-
spect to injuries received while going to and from work. The deceased em-
ployee was struck by an automobile late at night while exposed to the risks
of walking along an unlit stretch of highway solely as a consequence of the
terms of her employment on the night shift and the location of the
employer's plant. Claimants sought to establish "portal to portal" coverage.
The Fifth Circuit refused to extend the Texas law, saying that this change,
if it is to be made, must be made by the Texas courts.
Wage Rate. Despite the importance of establishing the injured employee's
pre-injury weekly wage, cases continue to be reversed by the appellate courts
because of plaintiff's failure to establish this important element of a compen-
sation claim."" Cases involving wage rate disputes have been substantially
reduced when compared to prior years.
In Norwood v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n"1 9 the issue was
whether the employee had proved that another employee of the same class
had worked at least 210 days in the preceding year. 20 On the wage rate
issue, the Beaumont court of civil appeals agreed with the carrier's conten-
tion that there was no evidence that the other employee was a workman of the
"same class"' 21 as plaintiff. Since the record was silent as to the similarity of
the plaintiff's job and that of the other employee and also as to the number
of days the other employee had worked at his job, the court concluded the
jury had no evidentiary basis on which to make a finding of average weekly
wage.
In another wage rate dispute 22 it was found that claimant had established
without serious dispute that he had worked 245 days in the year preceding
his injury for which he was paid and had received additional pay for vaca-
tions and holidays. Plaintiff did not testify as to his gross earnings, but evi-
dence was provided by his employer's records custodian which showed total
earnings of $8,381.57. In answer to a special issue, the jury found a pre-
injury average daily wage of $30.11 which plaintiff contended was not sup-
ported by the evidence. The court agreed, saying that the average daily
wage, under these facts, became a matter of simple mathematics, i.e., divid-
had walked behind the serving line to greet fellow employees when she sustained her
injury. The court observed here that it was for the employer's benefit that the employ-
ees were required to draw their pay in person at the employer's place of business even
during the vacation period. Thus, the court felt there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port a finding that the employee was in the course and scope of her employment at
the time of injury.
116. Flores v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 1972).
117. See Comment, Continuing Problems of Travel and Transportation, I ST.
MARv's L.J. 89 (1969); Comment, The Coming-and-Going Rule and Article 8309, Sec-
tion 1b, 22 Sw. L.J. 841 (1968).
118. "Average weekly wages" defined according to statutory formula, consists of 300
times the average daily wage earned (during the days actually worked in the year im-
mediately preceding the injury) divided by 52. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309,
§ 1 (1967).
119. 489 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972).
120. TEx. REV. CirV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967).
121. Id.
122. Morris v. Transport Ins. Co., 487 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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ing the gross amount earned ($8,381.57) by the number of days actually
worked (245).123
Medical Benefits. In 1957 the Workmen's Compensation Act was amended
to allow for lifetime medical treatment for injured employees. 124 In -the six-
teen years since that time the courts have continued to deal with new, as
well as recurrent problems centering around the interpretation of the medical
benefits portion of the Act. A large number of cases are concerned with
whether there is any evidence that the insurance carrier has failed, refused,
or neglected to provide timely medical care and treatment. In Gobert v.
Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n125 the claimant was sent to the company
doctor for examination and later the claimant sought the aid of his family
doctor with the approval of his employer. A hernia operation was per-
formed but apparently without notice being given to the carrier. The court
found that there was no evidence to show that Texas Employers' had re-
fused, failed, or neglected to furnish proper medical service. 126
Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Chappel1127 raised interesting ques-
tions concerning the procedural aspects of enforcing the lifetime medical
benefits provided under the Act. Here, claimant was injured in 1962 and
also sustained a subsequent injury in 1969. Two different insurance car-
riers covered the employer for which claimant was working at those times.
Texas Employers' contended that it was not notified that the claimant was
in need of medical attention following his accident of June 1969. The court
of civil appeals held that it was conclusively established by the evidence that
the insurance carrier refused, failed, and neglected to provide the medical
services required by the claimant. 128 Further, there was testimony from a
claims man representing TEIA that it would have refused medical care and
treatment even if a specific request had been made by the claimant. The
Texas Supreme Court, however, followed the general rule in holding that
after a claimant has notified the carrier of an injury, no further special re-
quest is necessary for each item of expense in order to attach liability on
the insurance carrier. The court also held that this rule is not applicable
when the injury and the need for medical care are separated by six years
in which no continuing need for treatment is made known to the carrier.
123. However, the court was quick to note that since no one contended that the
gross amount earned should have been divided by the number of days for which plain-
tiff was paid (261), it expressed no opinion on that matter. Id. at 782. Computing
the average daily wage in that fashion would have resulted in a lower daily wage, a
lower average weekly wage, and finally, a lower net verdict for plaintiff.
124. Ch. 397, § 1, [1957] Tex. Laws 1187, as amended, TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306, § 7 (Supp. 1973).
125. 491 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
126. A similar situation occurred in Olivarez v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 486
S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972). The jury was asked to find the
reasonable cost of medical expenses incurred by the claimant as a result of his injury.
It answered "zero." The court noted that the insurance company had not authorized
treatment by two chiropractors who saw claimant and, thus, the appellate record
showed no evidence that carrier refused, failed, or neglected to furnish medical care
and treatment. Thus, the court concluded that the jury was warranted in returning its
verdict of "zero."
127. 494 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1973).
128. 486 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972), rev'd in part and aff'd
in part per curiam, 494 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1973).
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Injured employees often have private insurance coverage in addition to
the medical benefits provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Most
of these policies, however, exclude on-the-job injuries. In Lively v. Blue
Cross Hospital Service, Inc.129 the private insurer paid some $9,000 in med-
ical expenses and intervened in the claimant's compensation case, contending
that this amount was paid by mistake since its group policy precluded any
injury covered by workmen's compensation insurance. The claimant sought
to recover the same amount against the compensation carrier and argued
that Blue Cross was not entitled to recover its money since the Act specifi-
cally prohibits the assignment of workmen's compensation benefits. 1 0 Blue
Cross contended that the statutory prohibition applied only to weekly com-
pensation payments and not to medical expenses. The appellate court re-
jected this argument, stating that the Blue Cross claim against the employee
could not 'be asserted in the workmen's compensation suit.
The Texas Supreme Court has recently granted writs of error in two cases
dealing with medical benefits. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v.
Wright'3' was a case in which the claimant refused to submit to a second
operation on his knee. The jury failed to find that the operation would
have materially and beneficially improved the claimant's condition. The
court of civil appeals held that the evidence established as a matter of law
that the second operation would have materially and beneficially improved
the claimant's condition.'8 2 Therefore, plaintiff's compensation benefits were
limited to fifty-two weeks because of his failure to submit to this second op-
eration. 38
In Watson v. Glen Falls Insurance Co.'84 the court considered the rela-
tionship between medical expense benefits and a subsequently amended stat-
ute138 providing for election by the claimant of whether to sue the associa-
tion or the third party defendant who allegedly caused the injury. The
claimant filed a third party action against a general contractor which ulti-
mately was unsuccessful.13 6 Following the final judgment in that cause, a
second claim was filed with the Industrial Accident Board for medical ex-
penses incurred during the six months following the first award. Summary
judgment was granted for the insurance carrier which was affirmed by the
appellate court. The court of appeals held that the injured employee had
made an election which would prohibit him from any further workmen's
compensation benefits. There is also a totally unanswered problem with re-
spect to tolling the statute of limitations in third party cases when all of the
weekly benefits have been paid but medical expenses still remain. Does
129. 488 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
130. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (1967).
131. 493 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973), error granted.
132. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12e (1967). [Editor's Note: The su-
preme court subsequently reversed the court of civil appeals on this point, holding that
"[t]he jury was not required to accept the testimony of the doctors as settling the ques-
tion .... ." 504 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. 1974). The burden of proof in this situation
is on the carrier, not the workman who refuses the second operation.]
133. Id. art. 8306, § 12b.
134. 489 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972), error granted.
135. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1967), as amended (Supp. 1974).
136. Pence Constr. Co. v. Watson, 470 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1971).
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the unlimited right to future medical benefits forever toll the statute of lim-
itations against a third party? Does proceeding to judgment against a third
party forever cut off a claim for medical expenses in the future? The Su-
preme Court of Texas has granted a writ of error in the Watson case and
it is to be hoped that the forthcoming decision will shed light on these yet
unanswered questions.* However, the statutory amendment which allows a
claimant to proceed against the association or the third party defendant with-
out relinquishing his remedy against either, may obviate the problems arising
from election of whom to sue and the effect of subsequent medical benefits
upon the statute of limitations.
III. PROCEDURAL LAW
Parties. The Texas Supreme Court apparently cleared up a substantial
problem area involving who are the necessary parties to an appeal from an
award of the Industrial Accident Board. The court in Latham v. Security
Insurance Co.187 examined the effect of one party to a board award filing
suit against another party, but omitting other parties who had appeared at
the Industrial Accident Board level. The court then reviewed numerous
past inconsistent opinions and announced the following rules:
(1) 'All parties to a suit brought by any party to set aside the Board's
award are before the Court for all purposes previously presented
to the Board.'
(2) 'It is not given to the party filing the lawsuit to determine who
shall and who shall not be parties thereto.' Defendants in such a
suit, prior to their appearance day, may join other parties who
have been before the Board.
(3) 'Those parties to the Board's award who do not become parties
to the suit to set it aside are entitled to stand on that award.'13 s
This opinion leaves the indication that all parties before the Industrial Ac-
cident Board would have to be joined as parties in the courthouse in order
to avoid the risk of a party's seeking to enforce the board's award. Yet,
on motion for rehearing, the court noted that those persons whose standing
is derivative to that of the employee, such as those seeking recovery of medi-
cal expenses, would not be entitled to enforce the award and thus need not
be made a party to a suit to set aside the award.'189
Latham was quickly followed by a decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals' 40 which involved a dispute as to whether Travelers Insurance Com-
pany or Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company was the correct carrier.' 4'
* Editor's Note: The supreme court stated in dictum that the election to sue the
third party made by the workman would not bar future medical payments. Rather, the
amount recovered in excess of previous medical payments would constitute an "ad-
vance" against necessary future payments. In Watson, however, the judgment in favor
of the carrier was affirmed, for the case presented by the workman's spouse was fatally
deficient, in that the wrong point of error had been preserved on appeal. Watson v.
Glenn Falls Ins. Co., 505 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1974).
137. 491 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. 1972).
138. Id. at 105.
139. Id. at 105, 106.
140. Bolton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 475 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1973).
141. Both carriers were members of the same group of insurance companies.
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The Industrial Accident Board had entered an award against Charter Oak
but the claimant had filed suit to set aside the board's award naming only
Travelers as a defendant. Travelers in its answer asserted that Charter Oak
was the proper defendant. The claimant moved to dismiss, arguing that the
court did not have jurisdiction over Charter Oak because it had not filed
suit within twenty days and had not been named as a party to a suit filed
within the same time. Judge Brown found that Bolton's case was covered
by the second rule which was set out by the Texas Supreme Court
in Latham, which provides that defendants in a lawsuit to set aside an award
of the board shall have until their appearance date to join other parties who
have been before the board. The court observed that it made sense to
allow a party, (in this case Charter Oak) who voluntarily submitted itself
to the jurisdiction of the district court, to be treated as having been formally
joined.
Accelerated Payments. Ordinarily, the claimant is compensated on a
weekly basis. However, the Act does provide two methods for accelerated
payments to the injured workman. 142 If the board or a jury finds that pay-
ments by the week would result in manifest hardship and injury, the insur-
ance carrier may be required to pay its liability in a lump sum. Addition-
ally, if compensation being paid on a weekly basis is inadequate to meet
the necessities of the employee or beneficiary, the compensation may be in-
creased by decreasing the number of weeks for which the same is to be
paid. 14  Both of these methods of acceleration were presented to the Texas
Supreme Court in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Motley.144 At trial
the jury returned a verdict in favor of claimant for total -and permanent dis-
ability benefits, but refused to find that a manifest hardship would result
if claimant's compensation were payable in weekly installments rather than
a lump sum payment. The trial court, however, awarded the claimant's
lawyer his fee in a lump sum and judicially accelerated 145 the balance of
the payments to the injured workman. The supreme court held that it was
discretionary with the trial court whether or not to order a lump sum pay-
ment of the attorney's fees. Although a lump sum award of attorney's fees
was approved, the court noted that since no jury issue was requested as to
a need for accelerated payments, the issue was waived. Thus, the lower
court judgments were left in effect (except for the rate and number
of weekly payments) ordering the carrier to make payments to claimant on
a weekly basis.
Special Issues. Conflicts in the jury's answers to special issues continue to
provide grist for the appellate mill, especially in the area pertaining to per-
142. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 15 (1967).
143. Id. art. 8306, § 15a.
144. 491 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1973).
145. The trial court accomplished this by first subtracting the lawyer's 25% fee
from the basic $49 rate to which claimant was entitled. This left $36.75 a week to
be paid claimant for 401 weeks. Instead, the trial court ordered the carrier to pay $49
for a period of weeks less than 401, thus paying claimant the same net amount over
a shorter time period. Id. at 398.
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manent partial verdicts. In Angelina Casualty Co. v. Jones146 the jury's
verdict was potentially conflicting since it found the claimant both totally
and permanently disabled and also disabled for a permanent partial period
of time.147  The insurance carrier contended that these answers constituted
a fatal conflict and that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial.
The jury found that plaintiff's total disability began in May 1967 while the
partial disability began in December 1967. Thus, the court observed that
there was no conflict in the findings of total-temporary incapacity during the
May to December interval. It was only in the period subsequent to Decem-
ber 1967 that the two answers potentially conflicted. The claimant elected
to accept the lesser amount involved in the conflict, that is, he chose to take
total disability at the rate of $25 per week for 300 weeks after December
1967, and further accepted the 29%ths weeks (May-December) at the
rate of $35 per week. Since plaintiff accepted the lesser amount he thereby
waived his right to recover the larger total and permanent finding. Conse-
quently, the court held that the defendant had not been harmed by the elec-
tion and the entry of judgment for the permanent partial disability. It was
noted that it was the duty of the court to reconcile the conflicts and the
jury findings if reasonably possible.
In the same case another difficult problem concerned the submission of
the issue dealing with the plaintiff's wage earning capacity during the period
of partial incapacity. The parties agreed to a stipulation, out of the pres-
ence of the jury, that plaintiff's pre-injury average weekly wage was $83.60
per week. The trial court submitted a special issue inquiring as to the dif-
ference between the pre-injury weekly wage and the claimant's average
weekly wage earning capacity during the period of partial incapacity. 148 Due
to the stipulation on pre-injury average weekly wage being outside the jury's
presence, the insurance carrier objected to this submission because there was
no evidence before the jury whereby it could determine a "difference" or
"reduction." The appellate court stated, however, that a review of the rec-
ord indicated that plaintiff had testified that he was paid $2.09 per hour
and worked five days a week. Additionally, plaintiff's medical witness testi-
fied that he had fifty percent partial disability. In affirming judgment for
claimant the appellate court felt it was error to submit the issue in the form
used, but it was not reversible error.
The submission of the insurance carrier's prior injury defense 14 was one
of the questions posed in Transport Insurance Co. v. Mabra.150 After find-
ing there was some evidence to support the proposition that a prior injury
146. 493 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973).
147. This finding conflicted with the court's instructions that a claimant cannot be
both totally and partially incapacitated at the same time. 2 TEXAS PATrERN JURY
CHARGES § 22.02 (1970).
148. This issue was submitted in accordance with the statutory language dealing
with partial incapacity. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 11 (1967), as
amended (Supp. 1967). But see 2 TEXAS PArrERN JURy CHARGES § 22.11, Caveat
(1970).
149. Ch. 316, § 1, [1971] Tex. Laws 1257, as amended, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306, § 12c (Supp. 1973).
150. 487 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1972).
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was compensable, the court stated that in order to establish its defense the
insurance company must prove: that the prior injury was compensable; con-
tributed to the claimant's present incapacity; and the amount or percentage
of such contributions. The court held that the three elements of the defense
constituted a "cluster" of issues pursuant to rule 279.151 Thus, an unsub-
mitted issue which is part of a cluster is deemed to support the judgment.
In this case, since there was no distinct objection to the court's charge point-
ing out the omission of an issue as to whether the prior injury was compen-
sable that issue is deemed to have been found by the trial court in support
of its judgment. The trial court judgment reducing claimant's benefits by
fifty percent due to the prior injury was thus affirmed.
The Texarkana court of civil appeals considered in dicta whether or not
after August 30, 1971, it is necessary to submit a special issue to the jury
inquiring whether the injury was the result of an accident. 152  It was noted
that the 62d Legislature amended that part of the Act which defines "in-
jury," "personal injury," and "occupational disease." By virtue of the re-
definition of those terms, "occupational disease" now also includes damage
or harm to the physical structure of the body occurring as the result of rep-
etitious physical traumatic activities extending over a period of time. 53 This
change in definition may abrogate the holding in Olson v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co.154 that a finding of "accidental" injury is necessary for re-
covery under the Act.
The question of how properly to submit the "dependency" issue in a dis-
pute over death benefits was decided in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Cassavaugh.15 5 The carrier objected to the charge on the grounds that the
special issue156 must inquire whether the surviving daughter was dependent
on the deceased father for substantial support and contributions. Earlier
authorities were reviewed and the court concluded that "substantial" need
not be placed in the dependency special issue.157
Trial Procedure. At least two cases during the survey year raised interest-
ing questions about procedural points during the course of a workmen's com-
pensation trial, which involved basic matters of strategy. In one case, 58
it was held that it was harmless for the insurance company's counsel to state
on voir dire that its doctor would testify that claimant had a ten to fifteen
percent disability. The court said that since the jury found a loss of wage
151. TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.
152. Haley v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 87 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
153. TEX. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Supp. 1973).
154. 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972).
155. 486 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
156. The trial court submitted the following issue: "Do you find from a prepond-
erance of the evidence that at the time of the death of William Andrew Stoddard,
Diane Cassavaugh was dependent for support, in whole or in part, on William Andrew
Stoddard for any contributions, services, or other things of value she was receiving from
him? Answer 'We do' or 'We do not.'" id. at 816.
157. See also 2 TEXAS PArrERN JURY CHARGES § 29.06 (1970).




earning capacity substantially larger than the ten to fifteen percent, if there
was any error, it was harmless. 15 9
Another case which raised numerous procedural and strategic points was
Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Gibson.160 Here the claimant obtained a
total-and-permanent verdict which was affirmed on appeal. Several inter-
esting points were raised in the case, ,but a large portion of the opinion dealt
with the jury argument made by claimant's counsel. The insurance carrier
raised several points of error with respect to an allegedly erroneous jury
argument. 16 However, the court of appeals overruled these allegations of
prejudicial error, illustrating, once again, the difficulty involved in having
a case reversed based primarily on "jury argument" points of error.
Evidence-Admissibility. Cases involving only evidentiary points of error
were rare during the survey period, but one of some significance was Callo-
way v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n.16 2  In that case the trial court
allowed proof of a 1958 felony conviction of the claimant to be entered into
evidence. The appellate court recognized that the trial court had a great
deal of discretion in admitting evidence of convictions, 63 but that in this
instance the 1958 conviction was too remote in time. The court found that
inasmuch as there were no other witnesses to plaintiff's injury, his credibility
was indeed important. With the admission of these criminal charges, the
court felt that plaintiff's credibility had been destroyed and, thus, remanded
the case for a new trial.
Another evidentiary problem arose in Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. v.
Adams'6 4 which involved the admissibility of a statement of the insurance
carrier's position before the Industrial Accident Board. The insurance com-
pany had contended before the board that the claimant's condition was in
the category of permanent partial disability. This conflicted with the insur-
ance company's position at the time of trial. The appellate court felt that
this statement was properly admitted based on numerous past cases.
Evidence-Sufficiency. There were no surprises during the survey period
with respect to appellate cases involving the sufficiency of the evidence. 165
159. This was an interesting comment by the court since the Act specifically pro-
hibits the computation of disability on a percentage basis. Ch. 18, § 4, [1969] Tex.
Laws 49, as amended, TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 11 (Supp. 1973).
160. 488 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
161. Among other claimed prejudicial acts during the jury argument, the defendant
cited the following: Claimant's counsel made an appeal to the jury to place themselves
in the position of the claimant; claimant's counsel wrote the answers to various special
issues on a blackboard; claimant's counsel advised the jury that an earlier injury was
not a compensable injury; claimant's counsel cast unjust criticism on the lawyer for the
insurance company; and, claimant's counsel sought to contrast the wealth of the parties.
162. 491 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
163. See Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1970).
164. 488 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
165. The volume of cases dealing with sufficiency points seemed to be substantially
less than in past survey years. With the exception of the "heart attack" cases, there
were only approximately eight to ten cases that could possibly fall in this category.
Those in which the courts held the evidence sufficient to support the jury's findings
were: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pacheco, 497 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973)
(evidence supported findings of permanent partial incapacity and that claimant had a
$30 per week earning capacity during such period of permanent incapacity); Rowland
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Nearly all the cases appealed by the insurance carriers concerned jury ver-
dicts of substantial value in favor of the claimant. Out of five cases wherein
the jury found the claimant to be totally and permanently disabled, 16 the
insurance carrier's contest was successful in only one. 167 In that case the
only evidence with respect to the permanency of his injury came from claim-
ant himself who testified that he felt he was getting worse instead of better.
The insurance carrier's primary points of error on appeal dealt with the
jury's finding of total and permanent incapacity. The Amarillo court of civil
appeals held that although there was slight evidence on this point (plaintiff
was getting worse; he had difficulty in lifting objects and otherwise perform-
ing manual work), it was so against the great weight and preponderance
of the evidence as to be unjust. In reference to cases involving sufficiency
points after a total and permanent verdict, one appellate court observed that
it is not possible to reconcile all of the decisions of the courts of civil ap-
peals ruling on "sufficiency" and "great weight" questions following total and
permanent disability findings.' 68
In Coty v. Home Indemnity Co.'69 the Waco court of civil appeals held
that a jury's failure to find that an injury was the producing cause of partial
incapacity was contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evi-
dence. The court did not cite any other cases in the course of the opinion
although none were probably necessary in the process of reviewing the suffi-
ciency of the evidence. The court did seem to place great reliance on the
testimony of an orthopedic specialist who found that the claimant had sus-
tained a twenty percent permanent loss of motion in his right shoulder as
compared to his left.
Damages on Appeal. Damages for delay in the amount of $1,231.54 were
assessed against the insurance carrier in Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. v.
Adams' 70 wherein the appellate court found the insurance company had no
sufficient cause for taking an appeal. The court stated that it was more
difficult to say whether or not the appeal had been taken for delay but that,
in any event, under rule 435171 the court could assess damages even in the
absence of a finding under rule 438172 that the appeal was taken for delay.
The appellate court felt that the point of law involved was so well estab-
lished that there was not sufficient cause for taking the appeal. The same
v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 489 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1973), error ref. n.r.e. (42 weeks of temporary disability supported by evidence).
166. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. White, 497 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Aus-
tin 1973); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Stephenson, 496 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Amarillo 1973); Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Monroe, 495 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1973), error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. McClellan, 490
S. W.2d 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), error ref. n.r.e.; Transport Ins. Co. v.
Kennon, 485 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972), error ref. n.r.e..
167. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. McClellan, 490 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
168. Transport Ins. Co. v. Kennon, 485 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
169. 494 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973).
170. 488 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
171. TEx. R. Civ. P. 435.
172. TEx. R. Cv. P. 438.
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point was asserted by the claimant in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v.
White 73 wherein the claimant argued that the appeal was frivolous and
taken for purposes of delay in an effort to obtain a discount from claimant
on the amount of the judgment. However, in this case the court was un-
able to conclude that the appeal was frivolous and thus denied claimant's
contention to that effect.
173. 497 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973).
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